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Perceptions and Attitudes to a Terrorist Shock: 
Evidence from the UK 
 
Abstract 
The emergence of transnational terrorism in Western countries has raised the debate 
about security measures, some of which could constrain civil liberties. This is the 
first paper that uses terrorist attacks (on 7
th July, 2005 in London) as an exogenous 
source of variation to study the dynamics of risk perceptions and its impact on the 
readiness to trade off civil liberties for enhanced security. In this framework we show 
that the willingness to trade off security for liberties is dramatically affected by 
changes in individual risk assessments brought on after a terrorist attack, and 
document the extent of its persistence.  3 
1. Introduction 
Terrorist attacks in the Western world (9/11, Madrid 2004, London 2005) have raised 
much discussion and concern about appropriate anti-terrorism measures, especially 
those that could affect civil liberties such as (electronic) surveillance and the rights of 
accused and suspicious people. Following the attacks of July 7
th 2005 in London, the 
European Union and its member states have debated policies to fight international 
terrorism that caused much controversy about the trade off between civil liberties and 
human rights standard.
1  Support for civil liberties can be seen as a construct 
involving value trade-offs where a balance between freedom and control is to be 
found. Finding the “right” balance between security measures that need to be taken 
to combat terrorism and respecting human rights and freedom thus could lead to a 
new “set” of civil liberties granted to citizens after the attack.
 2  For the general 
population – probably more than for experts – the perception of risk plays a 
dominant role when decisions concern situations surrounded by extreme uncertainty. 
These perceptions also play an important role in the preparedness to deal with the 
threat of terrorism and the readiness to trade-off civil liberties for security.
3  
Previous studies have identified that education, socio-economic background, 
political and social participation, and party identification play central roles in 
                                                 
1 T. Balzacq and S. Carrera, ‘The EU’s Fight against International Terrorism - Security Problems, 
Insecure Solutions’, CEPS Policy Brief No. 80 (2005). 
2 Darren W. Davis and Brian D. Silver, ‘Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of 
the Terrorist Attacks on America’, American Journal of Political Science, 48 (2004), 28–46; Walter 
Enders and Todd Sandler, The Political Economy of Terrorism, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006; W Kip Viscusi and Richard  Zeckhauser, ‘ Sacrificing Civil Liberties to Reduce 
Terrorism Risks’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 26(2003), 99-120. 
3 Paul Slovic and Elke U. Weber, ‘Perception of Risk Posed by Extreme Events’, Paper prepared for 
discussion at the conference ‘Risk Management strategies in an Uncertain World’, Palisades, New 
York, April 12-13, 2002  4 
explaining tolerance and support for civil liberties.
4 However, the demand for civil 
liberties can also be affected by pressure put on societies through threats and external 
shocks. For example, it has been shown that constant pressure from China and 
perceived threats from the Taiwan independence movement significantly impact on 
citizens’ level of tolerance.
5  Also, on the analysis of the effect of trust in the 
government and the sense of threat on support for civil liberties, it was found that 
U.S. Americans are generally favour of protecting liberties over security. 
Nevertheless, when the trade-off is being framed as a need to be safe in specific 
associations with terrorism, people do seem to be prepared to accept some cuts in 
their civil liberties.
6  
Factors that determine peoples’ proclivity for security measures are perceived 
threat and trust level; attitudinal measures such as interpersonal trust and national 
pride; and individual characteristics (e.g. ethnicity, age and education). Similarly, 
perceived threat consistently results in higher support for domestic anti-terrorism 
policies such as national identification cards or monitoring of telephones and e-mails. 
Higher perceived risks also lead to more concerns about failure to enact strong 
measures than to concerns about restricting civil liberties.
7  
                                                 
4  e.g. W. B. Devall, ‘Support for Civil Liberties among English-Speaking Canadian University 
Students’, Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, 3 (1970), 
433-449; J. L. Guth and J. C. Green, ‘An Ideology of Rights: Support for Civil Liberties among 
Political Activists’, Political Behavior, 13 (1991), 321-344. 
5  T. Y. Wang and G. A. Chang, ‘External Threats and Political Tolerance in Taiwan’, Political 
Research Quarterly, 59 (2006), 377-388. 
6 Davis and Silver, ‘Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist Attacks 
on America’, American Journal of Political Science, 48 (2004), 28-46.  
7 L. Huddy, S. Feldman, C. Taber and G. Lahav, ‘Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism 
Policies’, American Journal of Political Science, 49 (2005), 593-608.  5 
The theoretical literature that addresses policy prescriptions to terrorism is 
rich and builds on different model setups. The conceptual framework for our analysis 
echoes on the articles who have modelled the trade-off between security and civil 
liberties
8. They show how an increased risk (perception) leads to a new equilibrium 
with less civil liberties as the expected damages evoked by terrorist attacks increase. 
They also show that different groups display different levels of willingness to trade 
civil liberties for more security. Despite the attention that these models have raise, 
there is little empirical evidence about the dynamics of risk perceptions and attitudes 
surrounding a terrorist attack. Post-attack dynamics on people’s willingness to trade 
off civil liberties for personal security have been explored by using two waves of a 
US-based survey implemented after 9/11.
9 While it has been found that the support 
for civil liberties did not change significantly between both post-attack surveys, it is 
not clear if those attitudes change right after the attack occurred. With the data 
available to our analysis, we can test that. 
 
In this study, we use the terrorist attacks in on July 7
th 2005 in London to 
analyze the dynamics of risk perceptions (in terms of perceived likelihood of a future 
attack in the near future, and the degree of perceived personal threat), the readiness 
to trade off civil liberties for enhanced security, and the demand for additional 
funding for security issues. Our analysis builds on previous studies that have focused 
on post-attack attitudes towards security enhancing measures, but goes one step 
further by using unique survey data that includes both pre- and post- attack 
observations. Thus, our paper adds to the existing literature by studying how public 
opinion reacts to the occurrence of a terrorist attack.  
                                                 
8 Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003), and Enders and Sandler (2006) 
9 Davis & Silver (2004)   6 
In particular, we pay attention to shifts in public support for civil liberties vs. 
security, risk perceptions, and the approval of additional funding for security 
expenditures. We study if such shifts in public opinion existed, their magnitude and 
persistence, and to what extent this reaction differs across groups. Lastly, we also 
exploit the exogenous occurrence of an attack to study to what extent risk 
perceptions affect changes in the proclivity for security measures. Since risk 
perceptions may be driven by unobserved individual characteristics, we set up a two 
step model in which we use the attacks as an instrumental variable to estimate the 
effect of risk assessments on the support for civil liberties. 
Using the British Social Attitudes survey
10, collected between June and 
November 2005, we show that the perceived likelihood and concern about a future 
terrorist attack increases significantly. Furthermore, our results show that these 
perceptions do not revert to pre-attack levels (at least not during the time span of the 
survey). However, we find that the willingness to trade off civil liberties for security 
and the support of additional public expenditures has a more nuanced pattern. Within 
our framework, we show that the willingness to trade off security for liberties is 
driven similarly by perceived threats and likelihoods. More importantly, our results 
show that the post-attack shift in public support for security policies in detriment of 
civil liberties is sizable: pre-post changes in the support for civil liberties are even 
larger than prevailing pre-attack differences between a politically conservative and a 
non-conservative person. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, we describe the data and pre-
post- attack dynamics in attitudes and perceptions. Section 3 we exploit the before-
                                                 
10 National Centre for Social Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 2005 [computer file]. 2nd 
Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], October 2007. SN: 5618.  7 
after dimension of the dataset (pre-post attack) to study how changes in risk 
perceptions shift the balance between civil liberties and security. Section 4 discusses 
the findings and concludes. 
 
2. Data and post-attack dynamics 
Data and Measurement 
Four our analysis, we use the British Social Attitudes Survey 2005 carried out by the 
National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) in Great Britain. This survey is being 
conducted every year since 1983, asking respondents about their attitudes and 
opinions on a wide range of issues. The data relevant for our purpose has been 
collected between June and November 2005, and thus provides information on the 
variables of interest just before and after the London attacks on July 7
th 2005.  
A total of 1,052 respondents have been asked about their attitude towards 
eight policy measures that could be implemented to tackle the threat of terrorism – 
such as freedom of speech, compulsory identity cards, rights for suspects of being 
involved with terrorism activities and people charged with a terrorist-related crime, 
surveillance of suspects, and the torture of suspects to get information.
11 On a four-
point scale, respondents could express either their definite or probable agreement (as 
a proposed measure is “a price worth paying to reduce the terrorist threat”) or their 
definite or probable opposition to proposed policies (as “it reduces people’s freedom 
too much”). We condense these eight different measures that define choices between 
civil liberties and security into a single index, ranging from 1 to 4.
12 This is done by 
taking a simple average among all answers for each individual, which were each 
                                                 
11 Please find the question wording and possible answers relevant fort his study in the Appendix. 
12 The internal consistency of our index is confirmed by a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.74.  8 
coded on a scale from 1 to 4.
13 The higher the index is, the higher the willingness to 
trade-off liberties for more security. We will subsequently refer to this as the 
willingness to trade-off index. Figure 1 gives information about the composition and 
evolution of the willingness to trade-off index. Averages before and after the attack 
for each of these components are displayed, with all figures being higher after the 
attack. That is, for every type of civil liberty considered, citizens were more likely to 
trade-off in favour of more security after the attack than before that event.
14  
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
We use two indicators as proxies for the perceived risk of a terrorist attack. 
First, we construct an index based on respondent’s opinion about how likely it is that 
a terrorist attack would happen in the next 2 years. We take their answers as a proxy 
for the perceptions of likelihood of a future attack, which is based on a scale from 1 
to 5 (higher values indicated higher perceived likelihood). Second, we compute an 
index based on the individual’s opinion about how the threat of a terrorist attack in 
Britain concerns them. We take those answers as a proxy for the perceived threat, 
which is also tabulated in a scale from 1 to 5 (lowest to highest degree of concern). 
From now on, we will refer to these two indexes as perceived likelihood and 
perceived threat indexes.  
Figure 2 displays a non-parametric estimation (lowess regression) of the 
evolution of the willingness to trade off civil liberties for security, and both 
perceived risk indexes between the months of June and November 2005. The figure 
shows the sharp increase in the perceived likelihood of a terrorist event in the near 
                                                 
13 A very small fraction of respondents chose not to rank some of the items. In order to accommodate 
for this without ignoring all other valid responses from the same participant (which could lead to 
selection bias), we use indicators that a particular item was not rated by the respondent. 
14 Statistically significant were changes in categories 1 to 4, 6 and 8.  9 
future and in the perceived threat level, both of which do not revert to pre-attack 
levels during the length of the survey. It also displays the dynamics of the 
willingness to sacrifice civil liberties in favour of more security induced by the 
terrorist attack and during the following months, showing a more nuanced pattern.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
Post-attack dynamics 
Figures 3 to 6 show the change in four indexes describing the reaction of the 
public to the 7/7 events. In order to understand post 7/7 dynamics for each of these 
indicators, we created time since attack indicators depending on the time elapsed 
since July 7th: Days 0-1 for July 7h and 8th, Days 2-6 for July 9th till July 13th, 
week 1 for days 7-13 since the attack, etc. Notice that the attempted attacks (July 21
st) 
occurs in week 2. We first normalized each index so that the newly transformed 
index has a pre-attack mean of 0 and a pre-attack standard deviation of 1. This allows 
comparability across post-attack dynamics between indexes. We then  ran 
regressions of the four indexes against a constant, time since attack indicators and 
individual characteristics: age (age 18-35, age 36-60, age above 60), gender, person 
having first degree or postgraduate, marital status and religion (Chirstian, religious 
but not Christian, no religion).  
 
Figure 3 shows that the change in the perceived likelihood of an attack 
increased immediately (pre-attack levels are, by construction, equal to 0 and thus not 
displayed) and remained significantly higher than baseline values throughout the 
duration of the survey (the 95% confidence interval falls in the non-negative region). 
There are no significant fluctuations after the initial adjustment: in particular, no 
shifts are apparent in week 2, where the attempted attacks were thwarted. This 
finding suggests that the public did not revise their risk estimates upwardly in  10 
response to the attempt: the fact that the attempt was not materialized may have been 
interpreted as an increased effectiveness to prevent attacks from occurring, and may 
have counteracted the ominous news of an attempt 2 weeks after a terrorist attack 
had occurred (on July 7th). 
 
How do these dynamics compare to changes in perceived threats? The profile 
of changes in the perceived threat index (Figure 4) after the attack is very similar to 
the patterns shown in perceived likelihood index, although its shift is less 
pronounced, about 0.6 standard units (on average) throughout the post-attack period. 
 
One of the central discussions after the occurrence of 9/11 was whether 
individuals would trade off civil liberties for more security. Because the survey was 
conducted before and after the 7/7 bombings occurred, we can evaluate to what 
extent the occurrence of an attack reduced the public support for civil liberties. More 
importantly, we can document the timing of a potential shift against civil liberties 
and its magnitude. Interestingly, as Figure 5 shows, there is a delay between the 
attacks and the change of support in civil liberties, even when expectations about a 
future attack and the concern it created changed almost overnight. As Figure 5 shows, 
the change in the willingness to sacrifice civil liberties became significant only one 
week after the attack occurred, that is, it did not materialize in the first seven days. 
Notice, however, that this shift occurred before the attempts of 21/7. The patterns 
shown in Figure 5 do not suggest any other relevant fluctuations thereafter. 
 
With the data at hand, one can only speculate why the support for civil 
liberties changed with a delay whereas expectations changed immediately. It is 
possible that shifts in public opinion about which policies to implement takes time to  11 
build because it requires thinking about the benefits and costs of different policies, 
whereas expectations may change immediately because the news of the attack caught 
the attention of the public almost instantly. 
 
So far, none of the three indicators we have considered returned to baseline 
levels, at least not during the time the data was being collected. As an extension, we 
have used responses from a different section of the survey asking the public about 
priorities for additional government spending. In particular, one of the questions 
inquired them which item in a list of options would be the highest priority for extra 
spending, and the second-to highest option. The list included 11 choices, amongst 
them “Defence” and “Police and Prisons”, which –at least in part- would account for 
the costs of increasing internal security. From these responses, we created an index 
for Security expenditures as budget priority, indicating whether the public included 
none, one or two items from “Defence” and “Police and Prisons” in their list of top-
two priorities for additional expenditures. This index can thus take a value of 0, 1, 2 
for a given individual. 
Quite interestingly, as figure 6 shows, immediately after the attack occurred, 
expenditures related to security became top priorities for additional public funds, but 
that shift did not last long. In the days 2 to 6, the index of Security as Priority 
returned to baseline levels, only to become significant briefly on week 2 (when the 
attempts occurred). It is possible, but remains a speculation, that the public may have 
incorporated an increase in expenditures after the attack occurred and thus expressed 
no need for further increases from week 3 onwards. 
 
 
  12 
Did different groups react differently? 
These findings lead us to dig deeper into the question whether different 
groups reacted differently to the attack. To do so, we created an indicator that the 
observation was collected on or after July 7
th, together with interactions with 
indicators classifying individuals in different groups according to age, religion 
education, gender, marital status and ideological orientation. We then regress our 
four indexes (perceived likelihood, perceived threat, willingness trade-off civil 
liberties for security, and security expenditures as budget priority) on these 
interactions and indicators for age, religion education, gender, marital status and 
ideological orientation. The sign and significance of the coefficients, as displayed in 
Table 1, indicate whether a certain group had, on average, a higher, lower or equal 
index when compared to the same group at baseline (pre-attack). We also report a 
test that indicates whether the reaction of the groups considered in each model is 
statistically indistinguishable from one another. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
We find that the effect of the London attacks on 7/7 on the perceived 
likelihood, perceived threat and willingness to trade-off indexes has been significant 
and universal across the entire population of respondents. The only grouping for 
which the reaction was heterogeneous is religion. Though individuals of all religious 
groups (including non-religious) revised their expectations of a future attack upwards, 
non-Christian religious groups revised their expectations with more intensity. 
  As seen in Table 1, column 4, the effect of the attacks on the demand for 
higher security expenditures is rather low. This is not surprising if we recall the 
findings shown in Figure 6, where the pressure for additional spending to security 
policies was only transient after the attack, and only noticeable in the first 2 days  13 
after the attack and in the week that the attempt occurred. These isolated reactions at 
specific times are likely to be diluted when comparing observations before and after. 
We do not find remarkable differences in the reaction of different groups.  
 





So far, we have analyzed our four indexes in a temporal and descriptive 
perspective, identifying to what extent the population reacted to the events on July 7
th, 
whether this response was persistent or short-lived, and whether the change from 
baseline levels was more prominent in specific groups. There is another type of 
analysis that is possible and worth exploring with the data at hand. One could use the 
events in London as an exogenous shift in expectations (likelihood of an attack, 
perceived threat) to interpret how these expectations drive the willingness to trade off 
civil liberties for security. We anticipate that it is equally interesting to explore 
whether a shift in expectations creates a shift in the willingness to trade-off civil 
liberties (which is, a priori, very likely), but also the magnitude such change. The 
support of civil liberties may be determined by individual characteristics, but this 
exercise illustrates to what extent this support is also driven by expectations and 
feelings of threat, which could be volatile in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. 
  Normally, testing the link between expectations (perceived likelihood) and 
feelings of threat and the support for civil liberties is difficult to test in a cross-
section of individuals, because of unobservable factors, such as individual 
preferences for civil liberty (“tastes”) or differences in risk perceptions may also 
affect our variables of estimates. These unobservables may drive –to some extent- 
the correlations that one observes in a typical cross section, making inference on the 
determinants of the trade-off between security vs. civil liberties hard to interpret.  14 
OLS or even more sophisticated regression models that do not account for 
unobserved heterogeneity are likely to yield biased estimates of the relation between 
security choices and risk perceptions. One solution to this problem is to use an 
instrumental variable that affects security choices (the variable to be explained) only 
through its effect on the perceived likelihood of an attack (the explanatory variable). 
A terrorist attack, by altering the perceptions about the likelihood of an event, could 
be used as such an instrument, since it is plausible that it alters the perceptions about 
the likelihood of an attack and that only through this channel it induces a change in 
the balance between civil liberties and security. 
  There are two characteristics in the data that guide our estimation strategy. On 
the one hand, we want to instrument for the perceptions about risks when explaining 
the choice between civil liberties and security measures: this suggests a two step 
modelling approach in which, in the “first stage”, risk perceptions are modelled, and 
in which, in the “second stage” the structural-form relation between support for 
security measures (security index) and risk perceptions is estimated. On the other 
hand, our variable for risk perceptions is coded in a scale from 1 to 5, so a natural 
option for the first stage is an ordered-choice type of model. Both these preferences 
are satisfied by a multi-equation, recursive mixed process model in which the 
security index (Si) is modeled as a linear function of predetermined variables (Xi) 
and the discrete choice Yi representing the risk assessment of individual i, plus an 
idiosyncratic error term (εi1) that is 
  1 i i i i Y X S ε γ β + + =  (1) 
The risk assessment is modeled as typical ordered probit where the latent 
variable, 
*
i Y , is parametrized as 
  2
*
i i i Z Y ε φ + =  (2)  15 
where Zi is a vector including predetermined variables and excluded instruments. In 
our case, we instrument risk assessments with an indicator that the observation is 
collected after the terrorist attack. As usual, the formulation that  j Yi = if 
1
*
+ ≤ ≤ j i j Y γ γ   (for “cut-off points” γ to be estimated, subject to normalization to 
ensure identification) and a multivariate normal distribution for both errors closes the 
empirical model. 
 
Research shows that risk assessments are driven by different factors such as 
gender, race, education, socio-economic background, political worldviews and 
trust.
15 In general, women and people with lower levels of education perceive greater 
risks associated with terrorism.
16   Individual characteristics such as religious 
background, social class, education and political identification have been found to 
determine the taste for civil liberties.
17  
Consequently, we consider the following additional controls: age, gender, an 
indicator of marital status (married or not), population density in the sampling cluster, 
number of household members, an indicator that no child lives in the household, 
religious affiliation (being Christian, being religious but not Christian) and 
                                                 
15  e.g. P. Slovic, ‘Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk-Assessment 
Battlefield’, Risk Analysis, 19 (1999), 689-701; J. Flynn, Paul Slovic and C. K. Mertz, ‘Gender, Race, 
and Perception of Environmental Health Risks’, Risk Analysis, 14 (1994) 1101-1108. 
16 B. Fischhoff, R. M. Gonzalez, D. A. Small and J. S. Lerner, ‘Judged Terror Risk and Proximity to 
the World Trade Center’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 26 (2003), 137-151; J. S. Lerner, R. M. 
Gonzalez, D. A. Small and Baruch Fischhoff, ‘Effects of Fear and Anger on perceived Risks of 
Terrorism: A national field Experiment’, Psychological Science, 14 (2003), 144-150. 
17 e.g. Wang and Chang, ‘External Threats and Political Tolerance in Taiwan’; Devall, ‘Support for 
Civil Liberties among English-Speaking Canadian University Students’; Guth and Green, ‘An 
Ideology of Rights: Support for Civil Liberties among Political Activists’.  16 
educational achievements (an indicator that the person has either a completed 
undergraduate or postgraduate degree).
18  
In light of results depicted in Figure 2, one may want to allow for a more 
flexible specification that includes the time elapsed since the attack. The indicators of 
risk perceptions show an immediate jump after the attack, while the average 
willingness to trade-off shows a smoother transition pattern and a gradual downward 
trend after hitting a maximum in early August. This suggests a “wedge” between 
perceptions and willingness to trade-off which should be taken into account which 
we allow for by including a time variable “days since”. 
 
Results 
Table 2 and 3 display the results obtained when jointly estimating the effect of the 
perceived risk on the willingness to trade civil liberties for security – equation (1), 
the so-called “second stage” equation; and the effect of the attacks on July 7
th, 2005 
on the perceived risk indicators, that is (2) or “first stage” equation.  
Table 2 shows the link between the two indicators for risk perceptions (the 
perceived likelihood and the perceived threat) and the willingness to trade-off, 
controlling for sociodemographic indicators. Both indicators for the perceived risk 
have a significant influence on the willingness to trade-off. Because it is plausible 
that post-attack fluctuations may occur, we include a time dimension of days elapsed 
since 7/7 and its squared value (days since 7/7)^2). Other than the attempted attacks 
on July 21
st, 2005, we believe that other factors such as public policy discussions and 
media reports following the attacks could explain those fluctuations. Unfortunately, 
we are not able to clearly identify dynamics due to the attempted attacks because the 
                                                 
18  Indicators of household income were also included, but remained statistically non-significant, 
perhaps because of additional controls that capture socioeconomic status.  17 
number of observations from the immediately preceding and subsequent days is too 
limited to support sound statistical inference. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 displays the first stage regression results for likelihood and threat 
perceptions as a function of the above mentioned sociodemographic characteristics 
and different time indicators, signalling that the observation comes before (after) the 
attack. We find that both the perceived likelihood and the perceived threat are 
significantly affected by the attacks. There is a significant slight non-linear decline in 
the perceived threat and likelihood, consistent with findings of studies for the U.S.
19 
Our calculations based on the regression estimates show that 40 percent of the 
change in willingness to trade off liberties for security after the attacks can be 
explained by the effect of the attack through changed risk perceptions. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Both the perceived likelihood and the perceived threat are significantly 
determined by education and income status. This suggests that people of higher 
economic status might feel less vulnerable, and that risks are estimated differently 
depending on the level of education.
20 The willingness to trade-off is consistently 
affected by various characteristics – independent of whether we control for the 
perceived threat or likelihood of a terrorist event. As seen in Table 2, opposed to 
absence of children in a respondent’s household and his educational level (which 
reduced the willingness to trade off), age, income status and conservative ideology 
have a positive effect on the willingness to sacrifice civil liberties for more security. 
                                                 
19 e.g. by Huddy et al., ‘Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies’. 
20 This point has already been made by Elke U. Weber, ‘Origins and Functions of Perceptions of Risk’ 
(paper presented at NCI Workshop on ‘Conceptualizing and Measuring Risk Perceptions’, 
Washington, DC, February 13-14, 2003).  18 
Also, people of Christian religion display a higher willingness, having already shown 
a higher perceived likelihood and threat level.  
 
4. Discussion 
This is the first paper using pre and post attack data to clearly identify the 
implications of a “shock” on risk perceptions, on the balance between security and 
civil liberties, and on the support for further public budgeting in security-enhancing 
policies. We find that risk perceptions, measured as perceived likelihood of an attack 
in the future and concern over terrorism increased after the attack. The change in 
perceptions correlates to a certain extent with changes in the willingness to trade-off 
civil liberties for security, although this shift only manifests a week after the attack 
occurs. All these changes in public opinion may not be surprising, but its persistence 
and magnitude are. Our results show that the post-attack shift in public support for 
security policies in detriment of civil liberties is sizable: pre-post changes in the 
support for civil liberties are even larger than prevailing pre-attack differences 
between a politically conservative and a non-conservative person. However, the 
impact of the attacks on the support for additional funding in security policies is 
weak and limited to the first days after the attack, and to the week when the 
attempted attacks occurred. 
We exploit the shift in perceptions brought on by the attacks to understand to 
what extent changes in perceptions may affect the support for civil liberties. This 
exercise illustrates to what extent this support is also driven by expectations and 
feelings of threat, which could be volatile in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. In fact, 
the average change in risk assessments in the population brought on by the 7/7 
attacks sparked a change in the proclivity to security policies (and in detriment of 
civil liberties) of roughly the same order of magnitude than the difference in  19 
proclivity to security policies of a conservative vs. a non-conservative person. This 
dramatic shift in attitudes following a terrorist attack has not been documented in 
previous research. 
There are important differences in the evolution of risk perceptions and the 
proclivity for security policies and public funding for them after the attack occurred. 
Put differently, more support for security policies does not necessarily position 
security expenditures at the top of budget priorities. This divergence brings important 
questions: Why is the support for more funding in security policies only a transitory 
phenomenon when risk assessments experience a persistent change after the attack? 
Why does the support for civil liberties take time to adjust to a lower level and why 
does this shift become weaker (although still remains significant) over time? We can 
offer different hypotheses, which would require more data in order to be tested: i) 
evidence that the government is handling a post-attack situation effectively (by 
identifying potential offenders) restores the balance in favour of civil liberties (and 
security expenditures become less of a priority) even when the threat is still deemed 
high, or ii) even when the risk is high, individuals “learn” (after all, the attack is an 
unusual event) that the “price to pay” in terms of civil liberties was perhaps too high, 
and this gradually tips the balance back in favour of liberties, although such changes 
are gradual and slightly perceptible in a survey window of a few months. What is the 
role of news in the formation of public opinions? Our study suggests that fluctuations 
in the debate over civil liberties and on additional funding for security-enhancing 
policies may be related to events occurring after the attack. There is evidence linking 
time spent viewed viewing TV coverage of attacks (9/11) and its content with signs 
of distress
21. Government management of expectations, minimizing worrying and 
fear while enhancing public preparedness and vigilance may be important to 
                                                 
21 Schlenger et. al (2002). ‘Psychological Reactions to Terorrist Attacks: Findings from the National 
Study of Americans’ Reactions to September 11’, Journal of the American Medical Association, 
288(5):581-588.  20 
minimize welfare losses in the post-attack period. However, one can only speculate 
about policy prescriptions: without more information it is not possible to check 
whether the public “overreacted” to the news. A case study combining this survey 
data with information about news flows may help in this direction. 
The implications for the study of the interrelationships between economics 
and security issues are twofold. First, it is conceivable that changes in individual 
attitudes affect the demand for security goods (even if they may be conceived as 
“public goods”) and may thus have a correlate in the share of resources that the 
society as whole devotes to minimize security risks. Second, it is possible that 
changes in attitudes and perceptions change the behaviour of individuals and firms 
having an impact on other sectors of the economy, apart from those directly related 
to security. While this is a conjecture, combining information about social attitudes 
and economic behaviour patterns may help elucidate this hypothesis.  21 
Figure 1: The willingness to trade off civil liberties items for security 
 
Source: own calculations based on data from British Social Attitudes Survey 2005.  22 
Figure 2: Perceived Risk Indicators & Average Willingness to Trade Off 
Liberties vs. Security 
 
Source: own calculations based on data from British Social Attitudes Survey 2005.  23 
Figure 3-6: Dynamics of Changes of Responses to the Indices  
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Table 1: Interaction Effects: Modeling Heterogeneous Change After the 7/7 
Attack   








Scale  1-5 1-5 1-4 0-2 
Mehod  Ord. Probit  Ord. Probit  OLS  Ord. Probit 
        
Model: Change Before-After by Age 
After*Age1835 1.257***  .697***  .210*  .178 
 (.268)  (.269)  (.125)  (.208) 
After*Age3660  1.119*** .642*** .2325***  .092 
 (.126)  (.128)  (.084)  (.137) 
After*Age60+ 1.027***  .667***  .322***  .069 
 (.154)  (.157)  (.101)  (.153) 
Test of Coefficient Equality, p-value  0.738  0.980  0.723  0.913 
        
Model: Change Before-After by  Religion 
After*Christian 1.034***  .563***  .292***  .069 
 (.125)  (.119)  (.065)  (.125) 
After*NoChristian 2.300***  .712  .432  .792 
 (.422)  (.730)  (.338)  (.502) 
After*NoReligion 1.055***  .834***  .121  .0825 
 (.146)  (.153)  (.102)  (.148) 
Test of Coefficient Equality, p-value  0.013  0.371  0.312  0.373 
        
Model: Change Before-After by Education 
After*NoDegree 1.107***  .682***  .236***  .107 
 (.115)  (.115)  (.066)  (.0100) 
After*Degree 1.213***  .555**  .353***  .0146 
 (.221)  (.219)  (.104)  (.242) 
Test of Coefficient Equality, p-value  0.662  0.603  0,340  0.723 
        
Model: Change Before-After by Gender 
After*Female  .997*** .770*** .199***  .192 
 (.119)  (.119)  (.061)  (.137) 
After*Male 1.275***  .539***  .315***  .008 
 (.172)  (.177)  (.102)  (.129) 
Test of Coefficient Equality, p-value  0.170  0.278  0.331  0.033 
        
Model: Change Before-After by Marriage Status 
After*NoMarry 1.124***  .546***  .158**  .287** 
 (.164)  (.152)  (.075)  (.145) 
After*Married 1.122***  .736***  .307***  .0047 
 (.132)  (.136)  (.080)  (.118) 
Test of Coefficient Equality, p-value  0.994  0.351  0.176  0.132 
        
Model: Change Before-After by Political Preferences 
After*Non-Conservative 1.176***  .666***  .219***   
 (.119)  (.117)  (.066)   
After*Conservative  .904*** .623*** .349***   
 (.198)  (.212)  (.120)   
Test of Coefficient Equality, p-value  0.228  0.858  0.345   
        
N 1052  1061  1065  2133 
Notes: All models include age (age 18-35, age 36-60, age above 60), gender, person having first degree or postgraduate, marital 
status and religion indicators (Chirstian, religious but not Christian, no religion). Variable After is an indicator that the 
observation was collected on or after July 7
th.Degree is an indicator that the person has first degree or a postgraduate degree. No 
degree is 1- Degree. Conservative is an indicator that the person considers him/herself as conservative and non-conservative is 
an indicator that the person does not consider him/herself as conservative.  26 
Table 2:  Estimation Output – Second Stage: Effect of Risk Assessments 
(Measures: Likelihood and Threat scales) on the Willingness to Trade Off 
Dependent Variable: Average willingness to trade-off liberties vs. 
security 
 Model  1 Model  2 
Perceived Likelihood  0.101**    
   (-0.051)   
Perceived Threat   0.170*** 
   (-0.054) 
Days since 7/7  0.006***  0.006*** 
   (-0.002)  (-0.002) 
(Days since 7/7)
2 -0.000***  -0.000*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age   0.004***  0.003**  
   (-0.001)  (-0.001) 
Indicator: person is male  0.004  0.032 
   (-0.036)  (-0.035) 
Indicator: person is married  0.045  0.031 
   (-0.041)  (-0.041) 
Log of population density of community  -0.011  -0.017 
where person lives   (-0.011)  (-0.011) 
Indicator: no children in the household  -0.165***  -0.132**  
   (-0.054)  (-0.053) 
Number of household members  -0.024  -0.022 
   (-0.023)  (-0.022) 
Indicator: person is of christian religion  0.073**   0.063*   
   (-0.036)  (-0.036) 
Indicator: person has other religion  -0.036  -0.088 
   (-0.121)  (-0.117) 
Indicator: first degree or postgraduate  -0.359***  -0.319*** 
   (-0.049)  (-0.05) 
Indicator: household income  0.135**   0.118**  
ranks in the top quintile   (-0.052)  (-0.051) 
Indicator: person considers   0.081**   0.070*   
him/herself as conservative   (-0.04)  (-0.04) 
Notes: Days since 7/7 measures the number of days elapsed since the attack if the observation comes from the post-attack 
period. For pre-attack period observations the variable takes the value of 0. 27 
Table 3:  Estimation Output – First Stage: Effect of Terrorist Event on Risk  
  Assessments (Ordered probit estimates)  
Dependent Variable:  Perceived Likelihood  Perceived Threat  
Indicator: observation from after 7/7  1.451***  0.900*** 
   (-0.132)  (-0.121) 
Days since 7/7  -0.015***  -0.010**  
   (-0.004)  (-0.004) 
(Days since 7/7)
2  0.000**   0.000*   
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age   -0.001  0.004*   
   (-0.003)  (-0.002) 
Indicator: person is male  0.157**   -0.142*   
   (-0.074)  (-0.072) 
Indicator: person is married  0.107  0.144*   
   (-0.085)  (-0.082) 
Log of population density of community  -0.008  0.033 
where person lives   (-0.022)  (-0.022) 
Indicator: no children in the household  0.009  -0.148 
   (-0.112)  (-0.109) 
Number of household members  0.004  0.005 
   (-0.045)  (-0.045) 
Indicator: person is of christian religion  0.150*    0.163**  
   (-0.078)  (-0.077) 
Indicator: person has other religion  -0.253  -0.079 
   (-0.22)  (-0.201) 
Indicator: first degree or postgraduate  -0.162*    -0.294*** 
   (-0.098)  (-0.102) 
Indicator: household income  0.250**   0.264**  
ranks in the top quintile   (-0.102)  (-0.112) 
Indicator: person considers   0.029  0.1 
him/herself as conservative   (-0.083)    (-0.086) 
Additional statistics fort he full model 
(first and second stages) 
LLn (log likelihood)  -1907.169  -1977.452 
N (number of observations)  1052  1061 
AIC (Akaike Information Criterion)  3916.338  4056.904 
BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion)  4169.219    4310.219 
Notes: Days since 7/7 measures the number of days elapsed since the attack if the observation comes from the post-attack 
period. For pre-attack period observations the variable takes the value of 0.  28 
Appendix 
 
Original wording for questions and answers from the British Social Attitudes Survey 
Questionnaire 2005. 
 
Trade off Questions (civil liberties vs. security) 
A number of measures have been suggested as ways of tackling the threat of terrorism in Britain. 
Some people oppose these because they think they reduce people's freedom too much. Others think 
that the reduction in freedom is a price worth paying. 
For each of the measures I mention, please say which of the views on this card comes closest to your 
own. 
 
1.  Firstly, banning certain peaceful protests and demonstrations. 
2.  Banning certain people from saying whatever they want in public. 
3.  Having compulsory identity cards for all adults. 
4.  Allowing the police to detain people for more than a week or so without charge if the police 
suspect them of involvement in terrorism. 
5.  ...denying the right to a trial by jury to people charged with a terrorist-related crime. 
6.  Following people suspected of involvement with terrorism, tapping their phones and opening 
their mail. 
7.  Putting people suspected of involvement with terrorism under special rules, which would 
mean they could be electronically tagged, prevented from going to certain places, or 
prevented from leaving their homes at certain times. 
8.  Torturing people held in British jails who are suspected of involvement in terrorism to get 
information from them, if this is the only way this information can be obtained. 
 
Answers: 
1 Definitely unacceptable as it reduces people's freedom too much 
2 Probably unacceptable as it reduces people's freedom too much 
3 Probably a price worth paying to reduce the terrorist threat 
4 Definitely a price worth paying to reduce the terrorist threat  29 
Risk assessment questions (Likelihood and threat) 
 
Please say whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. 
•  It is very likely that there will be a major terrorist attack in Britain in the next couple of years. 
(Likelihood) 
•  The threat of a terrorist attack in Britain is of great concern to me. (Threat) 
 
Answers: 
1 Agree strongly 
2 Agree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Disagree 
5 Disagree strongly 
 
Choice for allocating additional financial resources to (at most) two issues 
Here are some items of government spending. Which of them, if any, would be your highest priority 
for extra spending? Please read through the whole list before deciding. 
 
And which next?  
List of choices: 
1   Education 
2   Defence 
3   Health 
4   Housing 
5   Public transport 
6   Roads 
7   Police and prisons 
8   Social security benefits 
9   Help for industry 
10 Overseas aid 
11 (None of these)  30 
Table A1: Summary statistics on sample 
Variable Obs  Mean  Min  Max 
 
Dependent Variables 
Average willingness to trade off civi liberties vs. security index  1062  2.68  1  4 
        
Perceived likelihood index  1062  4.29  1  5 
        
Perceived threat index  1060  4.26  1  5 
        
        
Continuous Variables 
Age 1062  50.13  18  94 
        
Number of household members  1062  2.28  1  8 
        
        
Categorical Variables (Indicators) 
Person is male  1062  0.44  0  1 
        
Person is married  1062  0.55  0  1 
        
No children in household  1062  0.72  0  1 
        
Person is of Christian religion  1055  0.59  0  1 
        
Person is of other than Christian religion  1055  0.04  0  1 
        
Education: First degree or postgraduate studies  1053  0.16  0  1 
        
Household income ranks in the top quintile (above 44,000 ₤ per year)  1062  0.17  0  1 
        
Person considers him/herself as conservative  1062  0.23  0  1 
        
Interview was made after 7/7  1062  0.83  0  1 
        
 
 